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ZONING AND PLANNING LITIGATION PROCEDURES
UNDER THE REVISED PENNSYLVANIA
MUNICIPALITIES PLANNING CODE
JAN

Z.

KRASNOWIECKI AND

I.

LB

KREGENOW*

INTRODUCTION

T

HE Pennsylvania legislature should reconsider the changes it
enacted in 1978 and 1988 affecting the procedures that govern
the administration, review and correction of local zoning and planning measures. The rules that govern procedures such as standing,
timing, ripeness, and scope, and availability of relief are as important in controlling arbitrary local government action as are the relevant substantive rules.1 Unfortunately, some of the 1978 and 1988
revisions to the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) were either
ill-conceived or ill-drafted, so that the zoning and planning litigation procedures have become muddled and, in some cases,
unworkable.
In 1972, Pennsylvania revised its 1968 MPC 2 by enacting extensive changes in the procedures for the administration and judicial
review of local zoning and planning measures.3 The 1972 MPC was
designed to tip the balance in favor of new development and
against the exclusionary tendencies of local governments. 4 That
spin has since been completely reversed by changes in the MPC
enacted in 19785 and 1988.6
The fact that the 1978 revisions met with little opposition from
the development industry is probably attributable to the fact that
the 1978 changes passed through the legislature within fifteen
* Mr. Krasnowiecki is a Shareholder in the Philadelphia office of Klett,
Lieber, Rooney & Schorling. Ms. Kregenow is an associate in the same office.

Their litigation practice centers on real estate, zoning, land use, environmental
matters and eminent domain proceedings.
1. See generaly Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania
Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1029 (1972) (examining rules governing zoning procedures and associated problems);Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 719 (1980) [hereinafter Abolish Zoning] (same).
2. Act 247, 1968 Pa. Laws 805 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,

§§ 10101-11202 (1972)).

3. Act 93, 1972 Pa. Laws 333 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-

11202 (1972)).
4. Mr. Krasnowiecki was the principal draftsman of the 1972 changes.
5. Act 249, 1978 Pa. Laws 1067.
6. Act 170, 1988 Pa. Laws 1329.

(879)
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months, giving the industry little opportunity to organize and present a response. That the 1978 changes were allowed to survive into
the major revision of the MPC, which occurred in 1988, and that
further limitations on a developer's ability to challenge the determinations of local governments were added without objection, is more
difficult to explain. It is possible that the recession deadened opposition. For the last five or six years, there has been little development pressure; 7 thus, very few developers have experienced the full
effect of the recent procedural changes to the MPC. When development picks up, however, the new MPC will become a major obstacle to such development. This Article examines the MPC from a
developer's point of view and identifies many of the new pitfalls
facing developers. The Article is also intended to furnish the practitioner with a road-map that not only describes the procedures set
forth in the MPC, but also examines the rationale behind them.8
Finally, the Article suggests possible revisions to the MPC and also
describes general considerations applicable to future reform. 9
II.

PROCEDURE FOR CHALLENGING ZONING ON

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

A.

Landowner Challenges

1. HistoricalIntroduction
In the 1950s, Pennsylvania developed a rule that all persons
wishing to challenge zoning on substantive grounds, be they persons who desire to secure relief from unwanted restrictions or limitations on their land (hereinafter "landowner challengers" 10 ) or
7. Normally Strong Sectors Aren't Helping Pa. Economy, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 16, 1991 (indicating that as of 1991 Pennsylvania's construction sec-

tor was still mired in recession); Mukul Panda, Architects Should Forget About Office
Buildings and Go Downtown for Business, BUSINESS FOR CENTRAL NEW JERSEY, Oct. 16,
1991, at 6 (describing effects of real estate recession in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania).
8. For a discussion of the procedure for landowner challenges to zoning on
substantive grounds, see infra notes 10-112 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the procedure for challenges to zoning on substantive grounds by persons
other than a landowner, see infra notes 113-41 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the procedure for challenges to zoning on procedural grounds, see infra
notes 142-44 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the procedure for review
of subdivision and land development decisions, see infra notes 145-61 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of proposed revisions and general reform considerations,
see infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
10. Although the MPC refers to such challengers as "landowners," the Pennsylvania courts recognized very early that a purchaser who holds an option or an
agreement of sale, even if conditioned on the overturning of the zoning restrictions, has standing to bring a challenge as a "landowner." See National Land & Inv.
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neighbors or civic groups who complain about development permitted on the land of another (hereinafter "protestants"), must do
so by taking an appeal to the Board of Adjustment (now the Zoning
Hearing Board in municipalities governed by the MPC). In an attempt to provide a statutory basis for this rule, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held in Jacobs v. Fetzer" that the landowner challenger must first seek a building permit for the use that he desires
(notwithstanding that a zoning restriction would prevent such a
use) and, upon being turned down, take the statutorily prescribed
appeal to the Zoning Hearing Board. 12 In doing so, however, the
3
court overlooked the wording of the statute.'
Thus, under the "building permit rule," the Zoning Hearing
Board was the forum in which the validity of the underlying zoning
scheme was challenged. A similar rule was also established for protestant challengers. In Knup v. City of Philadelphia,'4 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that the protestants must wait until the
building permit issues, and then appeal to the Board.' 5 While
there was very little statutory basis for the holdings in Jacobs16 and
Knup,' 7 the practical merit of the rule was that it enabled the courts
to avoid lengthy evidentiary hearings and probably allowed litigants
to make their record more quickly in a less formal (albeit, for the
landowner, more hostile) forum.
Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 603 (Pa. 1965). This view was codified in the MPC in
1972 and carried forward into the 1978 MPC. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10107(a)
(Supp. 1994). For further discussion of the rule on standing for landowner challengers, see infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
11. 112 A.2d 356 (Pa. 1955).
12. Id. at 357-58.
13. Under the old Zoning Enabling Act, there was no basis for invoking the
jurisdiction of the Board of Adjustment (now the Zoning Hearing Board) except
on appeal from the action of the "Administrative Officer" (now the Zoning Officer). In developing the building permit rule, the Pennsylvania courts erroneously thought that a building permit rejection for zoning reasons would serve as
such an action. The courts overlooked the fact that the Board's jurisdiction was
limited to correcting mistakes or errors of the administrative officer. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 10909 (repealed 1988). A permit officer who refuses a permit for a
use that is clearly not permitted by the zoning ordinance (for example, an apartment building in a single family detached zoning district) is not committing any
error.
14. 126 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1956).
15. Id. at 403.
16. Jacob v. Fetzer, 112 A.2d 356 (Pa. 1955). For a discussion of how the
Jacobs court overlooked the wording of the statute in the case of a land use appeal,
see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
17. Knup v. City of Phila., 126 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1956). In the case of a protestant
appeal, a zoning officer or building inspector who issues a building permit for a
building that is permitted by the zoning is likewise committing no mistake or
error.
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There were, however, several very serious defects in the old
Pennsylvania procedure. First, by requiring the landowner challenger to secure a turndown for a building permit, the rule suggested that the challenger must process the development to the
point where an application for a building permit would be appropriate, even though the desired development was clearly prohibited
by the zoning. In connection with a large subdivision, that meant
that a developer could not challenge a minimum lot size requirement without first doing all of the engineering work as well as posting appropriate security for the completion of basic improvements
in the desired but not permitted subdivision, because typically, only
then would a building permit be available. Fortunately, in National
Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn,'8 the case that launched the Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning doctrine, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania approved a procedure in which the developer would simply
submit a sketch plan of one substandard lot to the building officer
and seek a building permit for a home on it, thereby satisfying the
building permit rule. 19
The insistence that the landowner challenger first seek a building permit also suggested that such a challenger must be the record
owner of the property. Again, the National Land case established
that the challenger did not have to be the record owner, but could
simply be a person holding an option or an agreement of sale con20
ditioned on his ability to overturn the zoning.
These two procedural rulings in NationalLand had more to do
with the explosion of exclusionary zoning cases in the 1960s and
1970s than the exclusionary zoning doctrine itself. If the Pennsylvania courts had held, as have many courts of other jurisdictions,
that the challenger must be the record owner of the land, in all
probability, we would not have seen many exclusionary zoning cases
in Pennsylvania. Existing landowners, who are typically long-term
residents of the community, are extremely reluctant to litigate the
zoning or to lend their names to litigation by others. A developer,
on the other hand, would be reluctant to invest in the land without
knowing whether he can secure relief from the zoning.
While National Land solved the problem for landowner challengers, it did nothing to modify the Knup rule that protestants
must wait until the building permit issues. 2 1 Matters eventually
18. 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965).

19. Id. at 604-05.
20. Id. at 603.
21. See Knup, 126 A.2d at 403 (holding that protestants must await application
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came to a head in Levitt & Sons, Inc. v.' Kane.22 Levitt sought to
develop some 800 acres that were then zoned for one acre minimum lot sizes: Levitt wanted to build single family detached homes
on one-half acre lots. Montgomery Township, in which the property was situated, approved of the proposal and rezoned Levitt's
property from one acre to one-half acre minimum lot sizes.2 3 The
Township included within the area to be rezoned some adjacent
properties that had also been zoned for one acre minimum lot
sizes.

24

After the rezoning ordinance went into effect, the residents in
the adjacent area that had been rezoned along with Levitt's property brought an action in the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery
County challenging the rezoning. In addition to challenging Levitt's rezoning, they sought to challenge the rezoning of their own
25
property from one acre to one-half acre lots.

The common pleas court dismissed the challenge to Levitt's
rezoning on the ground that the challenge was premature because
the protestants should have waited until the building permit issued.2 6 The court sustained a challenge to the rezoning of the protestants' properties on the grounds that the new zoning was in
27
general arbitrary and capricious.
Ironically, but not surprisingly, Levitt appealed the decision
that had dismissed the protestants' challenge to the rezoning of his
property as premature. 2 Levitt's strategy of appealing an apparently favorable ruling is easily understandable. The ruling left a
sword of Damocles hanging over the development, requiring Levitt
to complete the engineering work on the entire subdivision, post
security for improvements and enter into a developer's agreement
before he could apply for and obtain a building permit that would
trigger a challenge by the surrounding residents. As would most
developers, Levitt preferred to have his rights adjudicated without
the necessity of incurring all those costs.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court dismissed Levitt's apto zoning authorities for building permit before following appeal procedure prescribed by statute).
22. 285 A.2d 917 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
23. Id. at 918-19.
24. Id. at 918. The Township rezoned a rectangle of about 1300 acres, of
which 800 were Levitt's. Id.
25. Id. at 917-19.
26. Id. at 919.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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peal on the grounds that Levitt had no standing to appeal a
favorable ruling. 29 Even more peculiar, however, was the commonwealth court's holding regarding the lower court's decision in favor
of the protestants' challenge to the rezoning of their own properties. The commonwealth court reversed the lower court and held
that the Pennsylvania building permit rule applies, so the protestants must seek and be turned down for a building permit before
they may commence an action.3 0 How that was supposed to be accomplished was not clear. If the protestants had applied for permits on one acre lots, they would have been granted the permits
because, obviously, in a one-half acre minimum lot area district,
homes on one acre lots are permitted. Had the protestants applied
for such permits, therefore, there would have been no adverse decision of the administrative officer from which an appeal could be
taken. One is tempted to echo Lord Coke's famous dictum: "He
31
knows not the law who knows not the reason thereof."
The only conceivable basis for the building permit rule is that
such a requirement is an appropriate test of ripeness, i.e., a necessary step to frame the issues. In most cases, however, the characteristics of the building itself have nothing to do with the issues in a
zoning challenge, so requiring a challenger to wait until a building
permit application has been ruled upon makes no sense. This was
32
so, for example, in the minimum lot size challenge in Levitt.
Neither the court nor the litigants needed to see what a single family detached home looks like in order to envisage the difference
between a development of single family homes on one-half acre lots
and a development of single family homes on one acre lots.
In 1972, the Pennsylvania zoning litigation practice came
under extensive legislative scrutiny. That year saw a complete revision of the litigation procedures through the adoption of a new
Article X of the Municipalities Planning Code and the adoption, in
Article VI, of the unique "curative amendment" procedure for challenging zoning.3 3 In 1978, the MPC was again revised.3 4 Many of
the changes made in the Pennsylvania procedures in 1972 were car29. Id.
30. Id. at 922-24.
31. See 3 E. COKE, A

SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD CoKE's FIRsT INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 574 (J. Thomas ed., 1818).

32. For a discussion of the minimum lot size challenge in Levitt, see supra
notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
33. Act 247, 1968 Pa. Laws 805, amended byAct 93, art. VI § 609.1, art. X, 1972
Pa. Laws 333 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (1972)).
34. Act 249, 1978 Pa. Laws 1067.
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ried forward into the new Code verbatim. s 5 Some were not and, as
we will see, in many cases the changes are inexplicable. When the
Code was again revised in 1988, the drafters embraced some of the
changes that had been made in 1978.86 The result is a mishmash of
ideas that makes it very difficult for a developer to obtain any relief
from an unfavorable local action and makes it equally difficult to
defend any local action granting approval to develop.
2.

Procedure Under the MPC

a. Jurisdiction of Zoning Hearing Board Retained: An
Alternative Route Through "Curative Amendment" Opened
The 1972 MPC continued the old practice of having substantive challenges to the validity of zoning go to the Zoning Hearing
Board. 7 However, the 1972 MPC opened an alternative route, that
of filing a challenge with the governing body via a "curative amendment." 8 Except for some important differences, which will be
39
noted later, procedurally, the two routes were treated the same.
Several concerns prompted the 1972 revisions that allowed alternative paths for zoning challenges. In addition to the unwanted
complications of the old building permit rule, 40 the Pennsylvania
procedure that required zoning challengers to take the matter to
the Zoning Hearing Board in the first instance created a practical
problem for the developer who, believing that he could persuade
the local governing body to rezone, decides to proceed before the
governing body first. Although requests for rezoning do not require the presentation of evidence, as a practical matter most developers tend to make their case for rezoning through the testimony
of experts and exhibits. Under the pre-1972 procedure, if the request for a change was not granted by the governing body, the developer would then have to proceed with a challenge before the
Zoning Hearing Board, putting on much the same evidentiary case
before the Board as he had just produced before the governing
body. To avoid this result and to encourage local governing bodies
to correct their ordinances without necessitating the intervention
35. Id.
36. Act 170, 1988 Pa. Laws 1329.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004 (1972).
38. Id. §§ 10609.1, 11004.
39. For a discussion of the differences between the alternative routes for zoning challenges, see infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
40. SeeJacobs v. Fetzer, 112 A.2d 356, 358 (Pa. 1955) (stating that landowner
challenger must seek building permit for desired use before appealing zoning ordinance to Zoning Board of Adjustment (Zoning Hearing Board)).
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of the courts, the 1972 MPC created the "curative amendment" procedure under which the developer could present his challenge to
the existing zoning restrictions on the record before the governing
body in an effort to persuade it to adopt a zoning change that
would cure the alleged defect. 41 If the governing body chose not to
adopt the proposed curative amendment, 42 the developer could
then go directly to court on the record made before the governing
body. The intent was to open two alternative and equally available

avenues of substantive challenge for the landowner regardless of
the grounds for the challenge: the landowner could challenge the
validity of a zoning scheme before either the Zoning Hearing
Board or the governing body. 43 The courts, at first, made a mishmash of this intent. Let us explain why.
Substantive challenges to a zoning ordinance fall generally into
two classes: (1) those that sound more like a "taking" argument
and argue the unreasonableness of a restriction by reference to the
location of the site and its suitability for the proposed use ("site
specific" challenges);" and (2) those, on the other hand, that argue the invalidity of a zoning scheme by reference to some overall
policy, such as the need for specific types of housing or the duty of
a local government to provide for all lawful uses ("community wide"
challenges). 45 Shortly after the enactment of the 1972 MPC, the
commonwealth court seemed to be leaning in favor of a rule that
41.

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 53, § 10609.1.

42. There was an issue under the 1972 MPC whether the governing body
would be free to disregard the amendment proposed by the developer and adopt
some other "cure," perhaps a modification of the cure proposed by the challenger.
Part of the problem had already been addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board, 328 A.2d 464 (Pa. 1974). The court held
that a governing body cannot, unless the amendatory ordinance was "pending"
before the challenge to the zoning was filed, cure the defect in its ordinance by an
amendment that is designed to "zone around" and to "thwart" the developer. Id.
at 469. This holding, however, did not preclude an amendment that would rezone
the developer's land to the desired category of development but change many of
the regulatory details such as height of buildings, density, amount of open space
and so forth. Id. In Appeal of Carr, 374 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977), the
commonwealth court clearly precluded that option. The ruling in Appeal of Carr
has now been legislatively reversed by the current MPC §§ 609.1(c) and
916.1(c)(5). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10609.1(c), 10916.1(c)(5) (Supp. 1994).
For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 70-112 and accompanying text.
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10916.1(a).
44. See, e.g., Robin Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 332 A.2d 841 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1975) (providing example of site specific challenge).
45. See, e.g., Township of Plymouth v. County of Montgomery, 531 A.2d 49
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) ('The key point is that when a municipal governing body
...confines its vision to just one isolated place or problem within the community,
disregarding a community wide perspective, that body is not engaged in lawful
zoning."), appeal denied, 554 A.2d 513 (1988).
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would have required all challenges involving "community wide"
grounds to take the curative amendment route and all those involving "site specific" grounds to take the route through the Zoning
Hearing Board. 4 6 That mistaken view was partially corrected in
Beekhuis v. Zoning Hearing Board,4 7 where the court held that the
Zoning Hearing Board may hear all types of challenges, whether
48
based on site specific arguments or community wide grounds.
However, there is a suggestion in the case that site specific challenges that do not include any community wide arguments cannot
be presented through the curative amendment route. 49
The revised MPC repeats verbatim the provisions of the 1972
Code to the effect that a challenger is free to submit his challenge
either to the Board or to the governing body. 50 However, the revisions then muddy the waters by stating that the Zoning Hearing
Board has jurisdiction over substantive challenges to the validity of
any land use ordinance "except those brought before the governing
body pursuant to [the curative amendment procedure].".51 This
language is either surplusage, because if a case is brought before
the governing body no issue of Board jurisdiction could arise, or it
suggests that there are some cases that may appropriately be
brought before the governing body, which cannot alternatively be
brought before the Board. This confusion should never have been
52
allowed to occur.
b.

Building Permit Turndown Not Required

The 1972 MPC abolished the rule that the developer must first
seek a building permit and then take his challenge to the Zoning
Hearing Board by way of an appeal from the denial of the permit.
Under the 1972 MPC, a challenge to the zoning ordinance could
be commenced simply by filing a challenge with the Zoning Hear46. See Robin Corp., 332 A.2d at 847 (holding that landowner's request for curative amendment, in challenge to zoning of his land only, was inappropriate). But
cf Township of Neville v. Exxon Corp., 322 A.2d 144, 147 n.4 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1974) ("We ... dispose of Township's argument that the curative amendment
procedure ... is limited to facial attacks on the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance." (citing Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New PennsylvaniaProcedures, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1029, 1102 (1972))).
47. 429 A.2d 1231 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
48. Id. at 1233-35 & n.2.
49. See id. (distinguishing between two-pronged challenges and site-specific
only challenges).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10916.1(a) (Supp. 1994).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10909.1(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
52. For a general discussion of the rules governing zoning procedures and
associated problems, see sources cites at supra note 1.
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ing Board or the governing body containing "a short statement reasonably informing the board or the governing body of the matters
that are in issue and the grounds for the challenge." 53 The substance of this provision was carried forward into the revised MPC,
although the old language was abbreviated to: "The request shall
54
contain the reasons for the challenge."
c.

Timing

Under the building permit rule, which required the landowner
challengers to wait until an application for a building permit had
been turned down before they could raise their challenge to the
zoning scheme, it was clear that the challenger did not need to
challenge a zoning ordinance as soon as adopted.55 Rather, a landowner challenger could wait until a permit had been denied-the
challenge would then have to be filed within thirty days of the denial.56 With the abolition of the building permit rule for landowner
challengers, the 1972 MPC restated the time limits as follows:
(b) The request may be submitted at any time after the
ordinance or map takes effect but if an application for a
permit or approval is denied thereunder, the request shall
be made not later than the time provided for appeal from
the denial thereof. In such case, if the landowner elects to
make the request to the governing body and the request is
timely, the time within which he may seek review of the
denial of the permit or approval on other issues shall not
begin to run until the request to the governing body is
57
finally disposed of.
For some unexplained reason, the revised MPC repealed this
provision. 58 It is now unclear whether there is any limitation on the
timing of a challenge. One of the functions of the repealed provision was to abolish the old building permit rule by stating clearly
that a challenge to an ordinance governed by the MPC may be filed
at "any time" after the ordinance becomes effective, but not later
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 11004(1)-(2)(a) (1972) (repealed 1988).
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10916.1(a), (c)(1).
55. For a discussion of the building permit rule, see supra notes 10-32 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the different rule applying to procedural
challenges, see infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
56. Act 247, 1968 Pa. Laws 805, art. X, § 1004 (repealed 1972).
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(b) (1972) (repealed 1988).
58. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 1988 Pa. Laws 1329, § 100
(1988).
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than thirty days after a permit thereunder has been denied. 5 9 By
deleting this provision, the revised MPC opens the door to the possibility that some court might reinstate the old building permit
rule. 60 It is possible that the deletion was designed to remove a
potential procedural trap for the unwary practitioner, but if that
were the case, the legislature should have dealt with the trap rather
than repeal the entire provision. 6 1
d.

Standing

The 1972 MPC also codified the National Land rule on standing for landowner challengers by defining "landowner" as any
"legal or beneficial owner or owners of land including the holder of
an option or a contract to purchase (whether or not such option or
contract is subject to any condition)."612 This definition, which also
controls who is entitled to make applications for development, was
carried forward, verbatim, into the revised MPC, section 107 (definition of "landowner").63
e.

Ripeness: Requirement That Challengers Present Plans
To ensure that challengers ask the governing body or the Zon-

59. PA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(b), (3) (1972) (repealed 1988).
60. For further discussion of the old building permit rule, see supra notes 1032 and accompanying text.
61. The trap would be sprung when a zoning officer turned the landowner
down for a permit under circumstances where a permit could be issued by special
exception. The landowner's immediate objective would be to appeal the denial to
the Zoning Hearing Board and request a special exception, If the case is one
where a challenge to the validity of the zoning would be appropriate, but the landowner forgets to raise such challenge with the request for a special exception, the
30 day time limitation will have run and the landowner would lose his chance to
challenge the validity of the zoning scheme. See Rittner v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 375
A.2d 827, 828-29 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (holding that substantive challenge to
zoning ordinance cannot be brought within 30 days after variance is denied if
more than 30 days have passed since denial of building permit). This result could
be avoided by remembering to combine the request for special exception with the
challenge to the ordinance. The difficulty with that solution, however, was that a
challenge to the ordinance could raise the hackles of the board sufficiently to result in a denial of the special exception where the board might otherwise have
been disposed to grant one. The deletion of the quoted limitations language from
the MPC might have been aimed at that problem, but neither this nor any other
reason for the deletion is given in the comments of the Local Government Commission that was responsible for the revised MPC. LocAL GOV'T COMM'N, GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PA., ANALYSIS OF REVISIONS TO THE PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPALITIES PLANNING CODE (Jan. 1989).

62. Act 93, 1972 Pa. Laws 333, § 107(12) (repealed and reenacted 1972). For
further discussion of the NationalLand rule, see supranotes 18-21 and accompanying text.
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10107 (Supp. 1994).
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ing Hearing Board to decide only those challenges to the zoning
ordinance that were ripe, the 1972 MPC required that "[t]he request shall be accompanied by plans and other materials describing
the use or development proposed by the landowner in lieu of the
use or development permitted by the challenged ordinance or
map. "64 To make it clear that a developer would not be required to
prepare final engineered plans when such detail has nothing to do
with the issues presented, the 1972 MPC went on to say:
Such plans and other materials shall not be required to
meet the standards prescribed for preliminary, tentative or
final approval or for the issuance of a permit so long as
they provide reasonable notice of the proposed use or development and a sufficient basis for evaluating the chal65
lenged ordinance or map in the light thereof.
For some inexplicable reason, the revised MPC carries this
plan submission requirement forward only for challenges filed with
the governing body under the curative amendment procedure and
does not require that challenges filed with the Zoning Hearing
Board be accompanied by such plans. 66 As a result, in Budco Theatres, Inc. v. Zoning HearingBoard,6 7 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court was forced to hold that challenges filed with the Board need
not be accompanied by any plans. 68 The revised MPC thus presents
the challenger with a new consideration when choosing whether to
go before the governing body with a curative amendment or to
present the challenge to the Zoning Hearing Board. In certain
unique circumstances a challenger may prefer not to submit any
plans with his challenge. In most cases, however, the plans have an
important role in that they provide a basis for granting definitive
relief.69 Why the legislature decided to abolish the requirement for
64. Act 93, § 1004(2)(c), 1972 Pa. Laws 333 (repealed).
65. Id.
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10916.1(c)(1) (Supp. 1994).
67. 632 A.2d 1072 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993). In Budco, the commonwealth
court rejected the argument of the trial court and board that the deletion was
merely an oversight by the legislature. Id. at 1075. Instead, the court chose to rely
on the plain language of the statute, which only requires that plans be submitted
when proceeding under the curative amendment procedures. Id.
68. Id.
69. The 1972 MPC requirement that all challengers submit plans sufficient to
describe the desired development served two purposes: (1) to facilitate the granting of definitive relief; and (2) to satisfy the concern of the courts that they should
not be required to pass on the validity of a zoning ordinance without having some
proof of the landowner's intent to proceed with a particular development. For a
discussion of definitive relief, see infra notes 70-112 and accompanying text.
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challenges filed with the Board and not for those filed with the governing body remains an enigma.
f. Definitive Relief
The specificity with which a challenger describes his project in
plans and other materials has a number of functions besides assuring a court that the challenger is, indeed, on the threshold of development (i.e., that his challenge is ripe). Theoretically, a court need
not see what an apartment project looks like in order to make the
determination that apartments have been unlawfully excluded from
the municipality in question. In reality, however, the design of the
project, the exact siting of the building or buildings in relation to
surrounding single family homes, or other site specific information
generally provided on development plans may have a significant ef70
fect on the outcome of a particular challenge.
70. Indeed, the relevance of site specific information in a case that involves
exclusionary zoning issues is merely the obverse side of another issue-whether a
court that invalidates zoning restrictions because they amount to exclusionary zoning, frees only the land of the challenger or all land in the municipality from any
restrictions that would prevent the type of development at issue in the challenge.
In Kasorex v. Board of Supervisors, 452 A.2d 921, 927 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982),
Judge Craig, in a carefully reasoned opinion, concluded that a successful challenge
to zoning restrictions, even when based on community wide reasons, only invalidates the zoning restrictions that affect the land of the challenger. In a prior decision involving another challenger and a different property, the court had held that
the Montgomery Township zoning ordinance was exclusionary as to mobile home
parks. Id. at 922. The Township subsequently amended its ordinance to provide
sufficient land zoned for mobile home parks. Id. The developer in Kasorex, who
arrived on the scene much later (three years later), claimed that he should be
entitled to develop quadruplex and twin homes on his land because the earlier
decision invalidated the entire zoning ordinance in the Township. Id. The developer unsuccessfully argued that the subsequent amendments to allow mobile
homes were meaningless because they purported to amend a nonexistent ordinance and, therefore, his land was, in effect, left unzoned. Id.
Because the developer in Kasorex sought freedom to develop for a housing
type different from that involved in the prior case, the decision does not necessarily
dispose of the question of whether the prior decree is effective against another
property. In other words, had the Township not cured the defect in its ordinance
after the first developer established that it was exclusionary of mobile home parks,
and had another developer then sought approval for a mobile home park on another property, would the decree in the first case be dispositive of the second developer's right to develop a mobile home park on this other property? Kasorex
does not necessarily dispose of that question; however, Judge Craig indicated that
his preference is to limit the effect of a decree to the particular property involved
in the challenge. Id. at 927. After noting Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board, 328 A.2d
464 (Pa. 1974), Judge Craig was concerned primarily with making certain that the
successful challenger be allowed to put the excluded development on his land,
with the right to obtain definitive relief. Kasorex, 452 A.2d at 927. Judge Craig
wrote: "However, a judicious balancing of developer and community interests
does not support the idea of enlarging [the threat of having the excluded development occur on the challenger's land] into a punishment by opening avenues to
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While a reviewing body may be favorably swayed by evidence
describing the proposed development, such evidence is indispensable if the challenger seeks relief that goes beyond the mere invalidation of the challenged restrictions and actually orders the
municipality to approve a proposed development (i.e., to grant definitive relief). Several practical and theoretical difficulties arise,
however, in securing definitive relief in zoning cases.
First, under our system of land use controls, land development
is subjected to a number of separate regimes of regulation at separate levels of government. For example, at the local government
level, a development typically comes under regulation both as to
subdivision and land development matters and as to zoning matters, each of which, though enabled in the same statute, is required
to be governed by a separate ordinance and is subjected to a different administrative regime. A court that overturns the zoning restriction cannot order the development approved until the
developer has completed the subdivision and land development
process. As already noted, requiring a developer to secure subdivision approval before he secures a determination as to the zoning
71
would subject the developer to unreasonable expense and delay.
In addition, because most local governmental agencies appear
to operate on the basis of the "Massachusetts crossing law," securing
a subdivision approval prior to a zoning determination may be impossible. The story may be apocryphal, but the Massachusetts crossing law was reputed to have said that, when two cars arrive at an
intersection that had no traffic light, both of them shall stop and
neither shall proceed until the other one has passed. Following this
wisdom, a planning commission will refuse to process a subdivision
approval if the lot sizes violate the underlying zoning. 72 Thus, it
non-challengers and thus extending the Casey rule beyond the Casey facts." Id.
For a further discussion of Casey, see infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
71. For further discussion of this burden, see supranotes 10-36 and accompanying text.
72. Many years ago, one of the authors thought that this problem could be
easily solved by a general law that stated that each agency and each subdivision of
this Commonwealth shall process applications on matters within its charge on the
assumption that all other agencies and subdivisions of this Commonwealth will
approve of those aspects of the development that are within their charge. SeeJan
Z. Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation: How to Win Without Really Losing, in 1 INsTrruTE
ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 20 (Southwest Legal Foundation ed.
1976) (citing frustration and inefficiency in waiting for approval by multiple government bodies). While such a law would solve the Massachusetts crossing law
problem by allowing the challenger to secure determinations of compliance as to
all aspects of its development before seeking court review of the zoning scheme, in
practice, it would not be particularly useful because few developers would incur
the costs of obtaining such determinations. For example, it is unlikely that a devel-
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usually happens that when the challenger appeals to the court to
remove improper zoning restrictions, he has not completed his subdivision and land development processing and has not had his
building plans reviewed under the building codes. Even if a court

has a final set of plans for the development before it, it cannot order the development approved and the building permits issued if
the local government has not had the opportunity to review and
pass on the development under other regulatory regimes that are
73
not subject to challenge.

Second, there has been reluctance in other jurisdictions to order a development approved because of a sensitivity to the separation of powers doctrine. The concern is that in many cases, where a
court holds zoning restrictions invalid, there are a number of alter-

natives which can cure the invalidity. A heightened concern for the
separation of powers doctrine would argue that a court cannot take

the choice away from the local legislative body by approving the
alternative chosen by the developer.7 4 However, the courts that
take the practical approach to the problem and order approval of
oper would spend the moneys necessary to obtain subdivision or PennDOT approval prior to seeking a court ruling on the validity of the zoning.
73. Precisely because the local government has unlawfully excluded the type
of development in question, it can often happen that the local government does
not have any regulations adopted under other applicable regimes to deal with the
development in question. For example, if the local government has totally excluded apartments and townhouses under its zoning, it is unlikely to have subdivision and land development standards that are applicable to these types of housing.
See, e.g., Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 333 A.2d 239, 249 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)
(rather than simply disregarding local prerogative to review site plans for development, court remanded case to municipality to apply reasonable standards in such
review).
74. See, e.g., Ed Zaagman, Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 277 N.W.2d 475, 480-81
(Mich. 1979) (ruling that matter be remanded to zoning authority for adoption of
amendatory ordinance comporting with dictates of equity). But see Schwartz v. City
of Flint, 395 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Mich. 1986) (overruling Zaagman as improper usurpation by judiciary of legislative function). An early opinion byJudge Schaefer of
the Illinois Supreme Court in Sindair Pipe Line v. Richton Park, 167 N.E.2d 406,
411 (111. 1960), argues that the runaround that the local government is likely to
give to the challenger if given the opportunity to select its preferred "cure" outweighs the need for judicial deference to the local legislature. Nevertheless, instead of giving the developer any relief, in Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808
(1975), the Supreme Court of New Jersey, after holding the Mount Laurel ordinance invalid as exclusionary of low cost housing, remanded the case to the Township with instructions to revise its ordinance to provide for such housing.
Naturally, the Township had fun with that redraft. Chastened by the experience,
in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192, 1226-27 (N.J.
1977), the court ordered the plaintiff developer's project approved, stating that
any lesser relief would deprive the excluded class, i.e., those seeking low cost housing, of their most effective champion, and thus "chill" the assertion of their constitutional rights.
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the landowner challenger's project, have a better understanding of
the abuses suffered by developers as well as the necessary remedies.
Local governments that have demonstrated their exclusionary bent
cannot be trusted to treat the challenger fairly, and given the opportunity, they will always punish the challenger by curing their ordinance on someone else's land. 75 If the landowner challenger
cannot get relief entitling him to develop, he is not likely to spend
the money to make the challenge and there is no one else, as a
practical matter, who is likely to proceed in his stead. 76 Indeed,
Pennsylvania has one embarrassing case that holds that the prospective residents of the excluded development have no standing to
77
challenge the exclusion.
In light of the practical need for a complete remedy, section
1011 (2) of the 1972 MPC authorized the courts to approve the development described by the challenger in plans and other materials
submitted by him with his challenge. 78 In order to reflect the fact
that the court may not be in a position to order approval of those
aspects of the development that do not involve the challenged zoning, such as subdivision and land development matters, section
1011 (2) provided that the court may
order the described development or use approved as to all
elements or it may order it approved as to some elements
and refer other elements to the governing body, agency or
officer having jurisdiction thereof for further proceedings,
including the adoption of alternative restrictions, in accordance with the court's opinion and order. 79
75. See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 328 A.2d 464, 468 (Pa. 1974) (indicating
that courts will not read statute in way that would allow municipality to prevent any
challenger from obtaining meaningful relief).
76. See id. (indicating that developers will not challenge unconstitutional ordinances if municipality could frustrate relief requested).
77. Commonwealth v. County of Bucks, 302 A.2d 897 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
The case rests on the Pennsylvania building permit rule that was abolished by the
1972 MPC. For further discussion of this rule, see supra notes 10-32 and accompanying text. The problem persists, however, because standing to bring challenges
under the MPC is given to "landowners," a term that does not include prospective
home purchasers or renters. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10107 (Supp. 1994). This
limitation appears to be inconsistent with Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), at least where federally protected
constitutional rights are involved. For further discussion of the standing issue, see
supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
78. Act 93, § 1101, 1972 Pa. Laws 333, 351 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 11011 (1972)) (repealed and replaced by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11006-A(c)
(Supp. 1994)).
79. Id.
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To prevent the local government from abusing the referral, section
1011 (2) expressly provided that "[t] he court shall retain jurisdiction of the appeal during the pendency of any such further proceeding and may, upon motion of the landowner, issue such
supplementary orders as it deems necessary to protect the rights of
the landowner as declared in its opinion and order."80 Both of
these provisions are still in the revised MPC at sections 1006-A(c)
and 1006-A(d),81 but, as we shall see, their simplicity has been
marred by additional requirements and poor draftsmanship. For
example, the provision requiring the court to retain jurisdiction has
been moved to a subsection that deals with the court's power to
take additional evidence (revised MPC section 1006-A(d)). 8 2 The
provision has thus been moved to a subsection where it makes no
sense at all.
The power of the courts to grant definitive relief was strongly
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Casey v. Zoning
Hearing Board.83 The court, in Casey, held that any legislative attempt to cure the defective zoning ordinance must be disregarded
84
unless it was pending on the date when the challenge was filed.
Subsequent decisions made clear that a cure ordinance is not
"pending" for purposes of the Casey analysis unless it actually has
been drafted and the draft advertised for adoption.8 5 This holding
not only supported the grant of definitive relief, but also disposed
of another potential problem-the local government gambit of attempting to cure the exclusionary defect in their ordinance by rezoning other land for the excluded development as soon as a
developer files his challenge, preferably land that is never likely to
be developed.
Although Casey precluded the local government from curing
its ordinance by rushing to amend it on land other than the challenger's, the court left open the possibility that the local government might be allowed to limit the developer's relief. This would
be accomplished by adopting in mid-stream, after the challenge has
been filed, a cure that would allow the proposed development but
limit it in various ways (i.e., by allowing the type of housing sought
80. Id.

81.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11006-A(c)-(d) (Supp. 1994).
82. Id. § 11006-A(d).
83. 328 A.2d 464 (Pa. 1974).
84. Id. at 468.
85. See Board of Supervisors v. Barness, 382 A.2d 140, 144 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1978) (holding challengers entitled to definitive relief because request for curative
amendment preceded first sufficient public declaration of intent to amend).
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but at lesser density than proposed by the challenger). That possibility was foreclosed in Appeal of Carr.8 6 The effect of Casey and Carr
together was that a community that waited to cure its defective zoning until a challenge was filed could be severely penalized by having
to accept the developer's perspective of the proper cure. This state
of the law had very salutary effects in curbing the worst of the exclusionary zoning practices.
Unfortunately, the effect of Casey and Carrwas severely undermined by changes to the MPC. In 1977, several Bucks County communities that were then experiencing significant development
pressures began efforts to update their ordinances to bring them
into colorable compliance with the prevailing exclusionary zoning
doctrines. In response, several developers filed simultaneous challenges to the existing zoning scheme. These were the facts in Board
of Supervisors v. Barness.8 7 The holding in Barness-that efforts at
rezoning not evidenced by an advertized draft of the proposed
changes are not pending and must be disregarded-so incensed
the Bucks County communities that they marched on Harrisburg
with a whole sheaf of changes to the MPC. These changes, based as
they were in anger and protectionism, became Act 249.88
Aside from provisions that have since been repealed, some of
them of questionable constitutional validity, 9 Act 249 aimed an arrow at definitive relief by requiring a court to make findings as to a
number of environmental matters before ordering approval of the
86. 374 A.2d 735 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977). The challenger in Carr filed a request for a curative amendment. Id. at 736. Subsequently, the Board of Supervisors amended the zoning ordinance to correct the ordinance's constitutional
infirmity. Id. However, the amendment fell short of the challenger's requested
relief. Id. The court held that the challenger's appeal should not be affected by
the amendment. Id. at 739.
87. 382 A.2d 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
88. Act 249, 1978 Pa. Laws 1067.
89. See, e.g., Act 249, § 1004(2) (a), 1978 Pa. Laws 1067 (repealed). Act 249
required every landowner challenger to certify in writing that the challenger did
not know at the time of the filing of the challenge that the municipality in question had resolved to consider a particular scheme of rezoning and that the challenger did not know at the time that the scheme of rezoning would be inconsistent
with his proposed development. This provision was aimed at what happened in
Barness and was enacted as Act 249, § 1004(2) (a), 1978 Pa. Laws 1067 (now reealed). The Act also purported to establish standards for a court to follow before
olding a zoning ordinance invalid. See Act 249, § 1011(1), 1978 Pa. laws 1067
(now repealed). However, in Hopewell Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 428
A.2d 701, 706 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981), aff 'd on other grounds, 452 A.2d 1337 (1982),
the commonwealth court held the provisions of § 1011(1) invalid to the extent
they sought to alter the constitutional standards for determining whether a zoning
ordinance was valid or invalid.
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challenger's plans in whole or in part.9° Because the unique Pennsylvania practice of channeling all zoning challenges through a local body for an evidentiary hearing and findings was designed to
save trial time on appeal to the courts, the Pennsylvania rule has
always been that the courts need not hear any additional evidence
in a zoning appeal. 91 The appellant may move the court to accept
additional evidence, but the decision to do so is discretionary with
the court, unless the appellant can show that he or she was precluded from presenting relevant evidence before the local hearing
92
body.
When Act 249 prohibited a court from granting definitive relief unless the court considered specific planning and environmen90. Act 249, § 1011(2), 1978 Pa. Laws 1067, 1071 (repealed and reenacted in

modified form as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10609.1(C) and 10916.1(c)(5) (Supp.
1994)). Under Act 249, the court not only had to consider the proposed curative
amendment and any plans or evidence produced by the challenger, but also:
(i) the locational suitability of the site for the uses proposed including
the general location of the site with regard to major roads, sewer facilities, water supplies, schools and other public service facilities or the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance of the municipality and county if

they exist;
(ii) the impact of the proposal on regional housing needs, the transportation network, and the other public services and facilities;
(iii) the suitability of the site for the intensity of use proposed by the
site's soils, slopes, woodland, wetlands, flood plains, aquifers, natural resources and other natural features;
(iv) the impact of the proposed use on the site's soils, slopes, woodlands,
wetlands, flood plains, natural resources and natural features, the degree
to which these are protected or destroyed, the tolerance of the resources
to development and any adverse environmental impacts; and
(v) the impact of the proposal on the preservation of agriculture and
other land uses which are essential to public health and welfare.
Id.
91. See Boron Oil Co. v. City of Franklin, 277 A.2d 364, 366 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1971) (requiring courts to admit additional evidence would undermine judicial
discretion and remove fact-finding function from board).
92. See id. As codified in the 1972 MPC, if the court declined to take additional evidence, the findings of fact of the local body could not be disturbed if
supported by substantial evidence. Act 93, § 1010, 1972 Pa. Laws 333. If the court
agreed to take additional evidence, the court was required to make de novo findings
as to all issues, regardless of whether the additional evidence addressed all the
issues or only some small aspect of the case. Id. The standard of review on appeal
to the commonwealth court reflected this practice: If the court below took no
additional evidence, the standard of review was whether the local body committed
an error of law or abused its discretion; if the court took additional evidence, the
standard would be de novo. See Appeal of Hoover, 608 A.2d 607, 610 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1992) (stating that where court did not take additional evidence, scope of review was limited to determining whether there was abuse of discretion or error of
law); Benham v. Board of Supervisors, 349 A.2d 484, 487 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)
(discussing scope of review when additional evidence is taken). Section 1010 of
the 1972 MPC was carried forward without change into the revised MPC as PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11005-A (Supp. 1994).
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tal issues as listed in the Act, several procedural questions arose. If

the challenger did not present sufficient evidence before the local
hearing body so that the court could make the required findings,
did the court have to hear additional evidence, or could it simply
remand to the local body for the taking of additional evidence? Act
249 authorized the court "to hold a hearing to receive additional
evidence and to employ experts to aid the court to frame an appropriate order," but it did not require the court to do so.93 The

choice appears to be within the court's discretion. However, one
thing seemed clear under the 1978 revisions: The findings themselves were required to be made by the court, so even if the local
body made such findings, the court was obligated to review the evidence produced before the local body de novo before making its
own findings.
The revised MPC, true to its anti-development bias, not only
adopted the requirement that definitive relief be preceded by the
consideration of the planning and environmental criteria listed in
Act 249, but it also required that the local governing body make
such findings for challenges brought by curative amendment and
that the Zoning Hearing Board make such findings for challenges
brought before the Board. 94 The same sections of the revised MPC
have reversed the holding in Appeal of Carr95 so that the local body
is not only authorized to consider alternative "cures," but also, in
the case96of the Zoning Hearing Board, must consider alternative
"cures."
The cure which is adopted, therefore, could be markedly different from the proposal submitted by the challenger.
While this authorization is probably still under the constraint of the
Casey97 decision, which held that the local government may not intentionally "thwart" the challenger's development, it goes a long
way toward taking the teeth out of definitive relief.98 Unless a local
93. See Act 249, 1978 Pa. Laws 1067.
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10609.1(c), 10916.1(c) (Supp. 1994).

95. For further discussion of Can, see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
96. The governing body, upon finding that a curative amendment challenge
has merit, is authorized to "adopt an alternative amendment which will cure the
challenged defects." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.1(c). Correspondingly, the
Zoning Hearing Board, upon finding that a substantive challenge has merit, is
directed to include "recommended amendments to the challenged ordinance
which will cure the defects found." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10916.1(c) (5).
97. For further discussion of Casey, see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text.
98. It should be noted that the revised MPC, retains a provision of the old law'
that states that a curative amendment challenge is deemed denied when, inter alia,
"the governing body adopts another curative amendment which is unacceptable to
the landowner." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10916.1(f)(3). This provision, however, is
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government is very stupid and simply digs in and refuses to give the
challenger any relief, it is impossible to imagine how anyone can be
assured of getting enough relief to make the litigation worthwhile
under the revised MPC.
The more recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on the subject of definitive relief do not provide much encouragement. In Fernley v. Board of Supervisors,99 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, after holding that the standards of Act 249 could
not be applied to deny relief to the challenger because that Act was
enacted after the challenge was filed, nevertheless found that the
challenger's right to develop the site for the proposed development
could be denied if the local government could show his plan to be
"incompatible with the site." 100
In H.R Miller Co. v. Board of Supervisors,10 1 the court drew a
strange distinction between defacto and dejure exclusionary zoning.
Generally, de jure exclusion occurs when a zoning ordinance contains no provisions for the existence of a use anywhere in the municipality. De facto exclusion involves two types of exclusion: (1)
where the zoning ordinance provides for the use in question but
the ordinance restrictions are so severe that the use cannot, in fact,
occur; and (2) where the ordinance provides for the use in question, but the area zoned for it is a "token" area not reflecting the
10 2
municipality's "fair share" of the use.
In H.R Miller, the landowner tried to secure approval for the
use of its land as a quarry. To do so, Miller showed that whereas
quarries are a permitted use in the industrial zone, they can not, in
fact, be developed anywhere in that zone because of a 500 foot setback requirement. 10 3 The lower court, after holding that the setback requirement effected a de facto exclusion of all quarry
10 4
operations from the township, struck the setback requirement.
However, the lower court denied site specific relief to Miller because, after applying the environmental factors, which under the
then applicable law was still the duty of the court, the site was found
not necessarily inconsistent with the new authority granted to local governments
by §§ 609.1(c) and 916.1(c)(5) because it does not direct that the unacceptable
cure be disregarded.
99. 502 A.2d 585 (Pa. 1985).
100. Id. at 591.
101. 605 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992).
102. See Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977).
103. H.R Miller, 605 A.2d at 322-23.
104. Id. at 323.
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to be unsuitable for the quarry operations. 105 The Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court affirmed this decision.10 6 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed that where there is a district
that permits the development in question and there is sufficient
land available for that use in that district, but the exclusionary effect is produced by some special requirement, such as setback,
height or bulk requirement, the vice can be cured by striking the
requirement from the regulations for that district ("cured district"). 10 7 In such a case, the challenger need not be given site spe-

cific relief, making it likely that the challenger will be unable to
develop his property as planned because his property may not fall
within the cured district. The court indicated, however, that where
there is dejure exclusion, some site specific relief must be given to
the landowner. 108
The purpose of definitive or site specific relief is to reward the
challenger for pointing out constitutional infirmities in the zoning
ordinance; otherwise, no one will have the incentive to do so. 10 9 If
that is the policy, there is no reason why the challenger who complains of a defacto exclusion should not be similarly rewarded. Logically, there is no reason why the H.R Miller philosophy would not
apply to a "fair share" case. If it does apply, a court finding that a
municipality failed to provide its fair share of a certain type of housing could simply order the municipality to make more land available for that type of housing elsewhere in the municipality, even on
land other than the challenger's. One can only hope that the
courts will not extend H.R Miller beyond its facts.
A recent decision of the commonwealth court, In re Appeal of
Miller & Son Paving, Inc.,110 suggests that the sloppy draftsmanship
that characterizes the 1988 revisions to the MPC may have backfired
in a significant way. When the legislature shifted the required environmental findings from the level of the reviewing court to the local hearing level, obviously with the purpose of making definitive
relief impossible to obtain, it failed to realize that the opening language of that requirement, which made perfect sense at the reviewing court level, deprives the local board of an opportunity to make
adverse environmental findings to support a decision denying a
105. Id. at 324. The lower court's decision was based on the "comprehensive
and progressive residential character" of the neighboring area. Id.
106. Id. at 322.
107. Id. at 324-25.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 636 A.2d 274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
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challenge. The old provision required the court to make environmental findings only if the court determined that the challenge had
merit. The same precondition has been retained at the local board
level. In Miller & Son, Judge Colins, author of the court's opinion,
noted that when a board has improperly denied a challenge, the
reviewing court will not consider the board's adverse environmental findings, if any."' In addition, the court is no longer authorized
to make any environmental findings of its own before granting de112
finitive relief.
B.

Protestant Challenges

1. HistoricalIntroduction
It has been noted that going as far back as the 1950s, the Pennsylvania courts required all substantive challenges to the validity of a
zoning ordinance, including those brought by protestants, to be
taken in the first instance to the Zoning Hearing Board. To explain
how the Board could claim jurisdiction over such challenges under
the then-applicable Zoning Enabling Law, the courts required all
such challengers to wait until a building permit issued and then
take an appeal to the board from the issuance of the permit." 3 A
weak excuse for the rule was that until the building permit issued,
the controversy was not "ripe" for adjudication.1 4 As noted earlier,
forcing challengers to wait until a building permit is attainable in
order to prove that a claim is ripe is nonsensical because challenges
to the validity of a zoning ordinance seldom involve building design
issues, especially when the challenge is to the minimum lot size allowed for a single family detached residential development.1 1 5 In
most cases, there are a number of significant events that precede
the issuance of a building permit and that might serve as a better
indicator of ripeness in cases where the challenger is a protestant.
First, there is the adoption of the zoning ordinance itself. One
might argue that requiring protestants to challenge the zoning
when adopted is unfair because there may be no change in circumstances that is apparent to a neighboring property owner until
there is some development activity under the new zoning classifica111. Id. at 277.
112. Id.
113. For a discussion of the "building permit rule," see supra notes 10-32 and
accompanying text.
114. See Knup v. City of Phila., 126 A.2d 399, 400 (Pa. 1956).
115. For an appropriate legal maxim relevant to this argument, see text accompanying supra note 31.
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tion. Under this theory, a protestant should not be asked to act
until it becomes clear that some change has occurred. Such an argument might be persuasive if it were true that controversial development occurs under a long-standing zoning classification of the
property in question. For reasons explained elsewhere though, it is
unlikely that any land is ever zoned for a development that might
be the least bit controversial in advance of the arrival of a developer
11 6 Most
who actually wants to proceed with such a development.
controversial development, on the other hand, is commenced by an
application for a zoning change, triggering widespread discussion
of plans for the proposed development at public hearings and in
the press. If that is so, there is very little reason to allow protestants
to wait until a building permit issues before they are required to file
a challenge. The absurdity of such a requirement when the type of
building has nothing to do with the issues, as in the case of Levitt &
Sons, Inc. v. Kane,1 17 has already been discussed.1 18
Moreover, issuance of a building permit is the one event in the
development process that does not require the publication of any
notice. How can one, therefore, justify the rule that protestants are
precluded from challenging a zoning ordinance if they do not file
an appeal to a building permit issuance within the prescribed appeal period-usually thirty days?'1 9 The answer that Pennsylvania
practitioners give is that protestants can always send someone over
to check on the issuance of a permit. How do protestants get notice
that they should send someone over? The answer is that they know
because there was recently a controversial zoning change. The
existence of the Pennsylvania building permit rule for protestant
challenges is proof that zoning for controversial development never
occurs in advance of development; otherwise, that rule was and is
unconstitutional.
2.

Procedurefor Protestants Under the MPC

a. Jurisdiction of Zoning Hearing Board Retained
As already noted, the 1972 revisions to the MPC, while retaining the rule that substantive challenges to the validity of an ordinance must be filed with the Zoning Hearing Board, dispensed with
116. See generally Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, supra note 1 (arguing that all
development occurs through zoning changes that are "applied for and granted on
the threshold of development" (emphasis omitted)).
117. 285 A.2d 917 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
118. For a discussion of Levitt, see supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10914.1(a) (Supp. 1994) (imposing 30day time limit on Board challenges to development application approvals).
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the requirement that such challenges be commenced by an appeal
from the "decision of the administrative officer." 120 Instead, such
challenges were to be commenced by filing a challenge directly
with the Board or by proposing a curative amendment before the
governing body.12 1
b.

Timing: Ripeness
Section 915 of the 1972 MPC,12 2 which was intended to govern

the timing and ripeness of protestant challenges, provided:
No person shall be allowed to file any proceeding with the
board later than thirty days after any application for development, preliminary or final, has been approved by an appropriate municipal officer, agency or body if such
proceeding is designed to secure reversal or to limit the
approval in any manner unless such person alleges and
proves that he had no notice, knowledge, or reason to believe that such approval had been given. If such person
has succeeded to his interest after such approval, he shall
be bound by the knowledge of his predecessor in
interest.123
Section 107(2) of the 1972 MPC! 2 4 defined "application for de-

velopment" as "every application, whether preliminary or final, required to be filed and approved prior to start of construction or
development including but not limited to an application for a
building permit, for the approval of a subdivision plat or plan or for
the approval of a development plan."' 2 5 While these provisions did
not require that protestants file their challenge as soon as a zoning
change authorizing a development was adopted, they did not per120. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr § 7 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce
rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE 218 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1968). The quoted language provided the basis for the Pennsylvania
building permit rule. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was originally enacted without change for most classes of Pennsylvania municipalities.

121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(1) (1972) (repealed 1988).
122. Id. § 10915 (repealed and reenacted as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10914.1
(Supp. 1994)). A special provision was added to § 1005, which was intended to
deal with situations such as the one presented in Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Kane, 285

A.2d 917 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972). For a discussion of Leitt, see supra notes 22-31
and accompanying text.
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10915 (1972) (repealed and reenacted as PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10914.1 (Supp. 1994)).
124. Id. § 10107(2) (repealed and reenacted as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,

§ 10107(a) (Supp. 1994)).
125. Id. (footnote omitted).
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mit protestants to wait until the building permit issued. The intent
of these provisions was that, thirty days after a preliminary subdivision or land development plan was approved, any challenge to the
zoning classification under which the approval was given as well as
to the approval itself was cut off, because, in the words of section
915, a successful challenge to the zoning would have the effect of
reversing or certainly limiting the approval.1 26 Mindful of the fact
that making a developer wait until a preliminary subdivision plan,
much less a final subdivision or a building permit application, was
approved may be too onerous (a supposition that is fast becoming
true of even the simplest type of development), section 1005(b) of
the 1972 MPC provided an alternative procedure under which a
developer could trigger a challenge before completing all of the
work associated with such an approval.' 2 7 All of these provisions of
the 1972 MPC have been carried forward with little alteration into
12 8
the revised MPC.
c.

Is the Building Permit Rule Back?

There should, therefore, be no doubt that protestants have
an obligation to file a challenge as soon as any preliminary or
final development approval is secured and, in addition, that the
developer has the right to foreclose a challenge by following the
procedure set forth in section 916.2.129 Unfortunately, the
commonwealth court has on two recent occasions reiterated the old
rule that allows and requires protestants to wait until a building per30
mit issues.'
126. Id. § 10915 (repealed and reenacted as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10914.1
(Supp. 1994)).
127. Id. § 11005(b) (repealed and reenacted as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 10916.2 (Supp. 1994)). Section 1005(b) stated:
In order not to unreasonably delay the time when a landowner may secure assurance that the ordinance or map under which he proposes to
build is free from challenge, and recognizing that the procedure for preliminary approval of his development may be too cumbersome or may be
unavailable, the landowner may advance the date from which time for
any challenge to the ordinance or map will run under section 915 by the
following procedure ....
Id.
128. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10107(a), 10914.1, 10916.2 (Supp. 1994).
129. Id. § 10916.2.
130. See City of Hermitage v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 613 A.2d 612, 613 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992) (holding that landowners had no ripe controversy until they
actually attempted to take advantage of rezoning by applying for building permit);
Association of Concerned Citizens v. Butler Township Bd. of Supervisors, 580 A.2d
470, 471 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (same).
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Protection Against Frivolous Lawsuits

It may come as a surprise, but many other systems of land use
control, for example the English system, do not accord standing to
neighboring property owners or civic groups to secure review of
planning action that permits development.13 1 The right to litigate
any decision that is favorable to development, which we accord to
neighboring property owners, suggests that we view land use controls as extensions of private property rights rather than as instruments of public policy. 132 Whatever the merits of that view, the fact
is that it gives our land use control system a significant anti-development bias. Because most development relies on outside financing,
which freezes when a lawsuit challenging a permit is filed, protestants need not seek temporary relief to bring a development to a
halt. The mere filing of a zoning appeal or permit appeal has the
same effect. Indeed, under the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act, which was in effect before the MPC, an appeal to the zoning
board from any action of the administrative officer automatically
13 3
stayed that action, so that protestants were given a free ride.
As we have seen, the 1972 MPC did not change the practice of
requiring that all protestant complaints about development, including challenges to the zoning ordinance, be taken first to the Zoning
Hearing Board.' 3 4 Nor did it change the provision that established
an automatic stay on appeal to the Board.1 35 It did attempt, however, to reverse the anti-development bias of the system by granting
to the developer whose permit was threatened by an appeal or a
challenge, the right to petition a court for an order requiring the
protestants to post bond or have their appeal or challenge dismissed.13 6 This procedure was available not only during the proceedings before the Board, but also on appeal from the Board to
the court.1 3 7 The 1972 MPC left the amount of the bond to the
131. See Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 62-63 (1965)
(noting that English system accords standing to neighbors only when challenging
"unneighborly uses" of land).
132. See id. at 58-59 (suggesting that standing may be extended to neighbor
"because we are persuaded that zoning is primarily designed to protect his interests, as distinguished from those of the public at large").
133. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr, supra note 120, at § 7.
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(1) (1972) (repealed 1988).
135. Id. § 10916 (repealed and reenacted as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 10915.1(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994)).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 11008(4) (repealed and reenacted as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 11003-A(d) (Supp. 1994)).
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court's discretion. 3 8 The idea was that a court could generally
sense from the petition and answer whether the attack on the development had any merit and determine the amount of the bond accordingly. In Driscoll v. Plymouth Township,139 the commonwealth
1 40
court upheld this procedure against a due process attack.
In 1978, the same group that hobbled the definitive relief provisions of the 1972 MPC also killed the bonding requirement by
requiring a court to hold an evidentiary hearing and to find specifically that the protestant's case was frivolous and brought solely for
purposes of delay before imposing a bond. 141 After that change,
there would be little sense in seeking a bond because a petition
would result in a mini-trial on the merits. If, having conducted
such hearings, the court were to order the posting of a bond, an
appeal could follow where the sole issue would be whether the
court erred in concluding that the protestant's case was frivolous
and instituted for the purpose of delay. If, on such appeal, the
commonwealth court disagreed with the trial court, the reversal
would simply lead to another trial on the merits. The 1988 revisions to the MPC merely reenacted all of the changes made in the
MPC during the 1978 assault on all pro-development provisions.
C.

Challenges to Zoning Ordinance on ProceduralGrounds

Under the old MPC, challenges to the process of enacting a
zoning ordinance or a zoning ordinance amendment were required to be filed directly in court within thirty days of the effective
date of the enactment. 42 The revised MPC requires all such challenges to be filed with the Zoning Hearing Board within the same
period. 143 There is almost no reason why a challenger (whether
landowner or protestant) would want to file such a challenge unless
the challenger anticipates an imminent change in the composition
of the governing body or a change of mind due to political embarrassment. A challenge on procedural grounds does not accomplish
anything more than delay. Should a court find the adoption of an
138. Id. §§ 10916, 11008(4) (repealed and reenacted as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§§ 10915.1(c), 11003-A(d) (Supp. 1994)).
139. 320 A.2d 444 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
140. See id. at 448 (holding that § 916 of MPC is constitutional as rational
means to effectuate legitimate state interests).
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10915.1(b), 11003-A(d) (Supp. 1994).
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11003 (1972) (repealed 1988).
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10909.1(a)(2) (Supp. 1994). Where a municipality is enacting a zoning ordinance for the first time and a Zoning Hearing
Board has not yet been constituted, the challenge goes directly before a court. Id.
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ordinance procedurally defective, the municipality may simply cure
the identified defect and reenact the ordinance. There is, however,
at least one set of circumstances in which a landowner may deem a
procedural challenge worthwhile: Where the landowner's application for development 144 or challenge to an ordinance would otherwise be trumped by the "pending ordinance" doctrine, he should
consider knocking out the pending ordinance on procedural
grounds, thereby gaining priority over it.
III.

PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW OF SUBDIVISION AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT DECISIONS

A.

Introduction

This Article bows to tradition in discussing zoning litigation
procedures before those applicable to subdivision and land development decisions. In fact, when significant development begins
again in Pennsylvania, it will be the issues surrounding subdivision
and land development that will spawn the next era of controversy
and litigation. Municipalities have discovered that there are few
standards, if any, governing the review of planning commission and
governing body decisions. Standardless discretion has proven to be
an almost irresistible invitation to excess and abuse. In theory, the
governing body and, of course, the planning commission, act in an
administrative capacity and must support their determinations by
pointing to specific provisions of a duly enacted subdivision and
land development ordinance. 45 Indeed, in 1972, it was believed
that time limitations on the local body's decision-making process
and certain procedural requirements would prevent abuse. Section
508 was enacted: (1) to establish some definite deadlines for rendering a decision (a ninety-day cycle for each mandatory step in the
procedure, with deemed approval of the application as the penalty
144. It should be noted that the protection of § 508(4) of the MPC, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(4) (Supp. 1994), which is given to filed subdivision and land
development applications, is unaffected by the existence of pending ordinances.
See Monumental Properties, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 311 A.2d 725 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1973). Other applications and permits, however, could lose priority to a pending ordinance. See Cherry Valley Assoc. v. Board of Supervisors, 554 A.2d 149 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989).
145. See Stoner v. Township of Lower Merion, 587 A.2d 879, 883 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1991) (holding that subdivision application cannot be rejected because it is
"inharmonious" with adjacent development if application meets specific requirements of ordinance); Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township Planning
Comm'n, 492 A.2d 818, 820-21 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (holding that denial of
subdivision approval on grounds that underground water supply may be decreased, absent any standards in ordinance, is too nebulous of reason to support
denial), aff'd, 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987).
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for inaction); 146 and (2) to require that decisions be in writing and
communicated to the applicant promptly 147 and that, if the "application is not approved in terms as filed the decision shall specify the
defects found in the application and describe the requirements
which have not been met and shall, in each case, cite to the provi14 8
sions of the statute or ordinance relied upon."
In reality, however, municipalities have found that by piling
vast amounts of confusing and self-contradictory standards and requirements into their subdivision and land development ordinance,
they can always find some standard or provision that has not been
met. If an unwanted development enters the subdivision and land
development process, the game is simply to hold it up as long as
possible until the developer is forced to compromise or withdraw
altogether. The ninety-day cycle has been ajoke. Prior to the expiration of the ninety-day period, the municipality simply tells the developer that unless he gives it an extension, his application will be
disapproved and he will then be required to litigate the disapproval
if he so chooses. Another technique for imposing delay is to approve the plans subject to three or four pages of conditions. 149
Most developers are forced by time pressures to either grant an extension or accept the conditions, only to find that the municipality
refuses to reach a final decision or acknowledge when the condi146. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(3) (1972). The 1972 provision was carried forward without change to the current MPC. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 10508(3) (Supp. 1994).
147. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(1) (1972). The 1972 provision required
that notice of the decision be communicated within five days of the decision. See
id. The current MPC's time limit is 15 days. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(1)
(Supp. 1994).
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(2) (1972). The 1972 provision was carried forward without change to the current MPC. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 10508(2) (Supp. 1994).
149. The courts have held that an approval with conditions that are unacceptable to the applicant may be treated by the applicant as a denial. Because § 508(2)
of the MPC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(2), has always required that a denial be
accompanied by written reasons for the denial, the municipality can be caught in a
"deemed approval" if its approval with conditions comes at the end of the 90-day
cycle and te applicant does not accept the conditions. Se e.g., Board of Township Comm'rs v. Livengood, 403 A.2d 1055, 1057 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (holding
that § 508(4) of MPC permits municipality to approve plan conditionally only if
applicant accepts conditions). Under § 508(1) of the MPC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 10508(1), the municipality has 15 additional days, on top of the 90 days, within
which to communicate its decision. See Sunset Dev., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors,
600 A.2d 641, 643 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (holding that MPC contemplates bifurcation of oral (90 days) and written (15 days) decision-makingprocesses) (quoting
Rouse/Chamberlin, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 504 A.2d 375, 378 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1986)). Consequently, all that a municipality need do is require that an applicant accept or reject the conditions before that time expires.
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tions have been met. For example, if a condition requires the development of a drainage plan that is satisfactory to the township's
engineer, the developer will suddenly find that the engineer is generally unavailable or has very high standards bordering on the
unreasonable. 15 0
Because subdivision and land development controls were not
thought to be significant impediments to development, there was
no support for 'Judicializing" the application process by requiring
formal hearings, cross examination of witnesses, stenographic recording and written findings. In hindsight, the lack of consideration given this issue was unfortunate because nothing would guard
against or prevent arbitrary actions on the local level better than
requiring that all evidence and decisions be placed on a permanent, accessible record.
B.

Applicant Appeals

The 1972 revisions to the MPC provided the applicant with a
choice between appealing an adverse determination directly to a
court or presenting his case first to the Zoning Hearing Board.151
The concern was that because there was no requirement for a record to be made before the planning commission or the governing
body, an applicant would have a difficult time getting a court to
reverse the local body's action unless he could persuade the court
to take additional evidence on appeal, which, as we have seen, is
1 52
entirely discretionary with the court.
The revised MPC not only repealed the old section
1006(1) (a),
but also confused the appellate provisions. The revised MPC draws
a distinction between "decisions" and "determinations." A "decision" is defined by section 107 as a "final adjudication of any board
or other body granted jurisdiction under any land use ordinance or
this act to do so, either by reason of the grant of exclusive jurisdiction or by reason of appeals from determinations." 15 3 That same
definition states that "[a]ll decisions shall be appealable to the
court of common pleas of the county and judicial district wherein
150. See generally Carolyn W. Poulin, Comment, Land Use ApplicationsNot Acted
Upon Shall be Deemed Approved: A Weighing of the Interests, 57 UMKC L. REv. 607
(1989) (providing overview of "deemed approval" statutes).
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11006(1)(a) (1972) (repealed 1988). Unfortunately, the section was somewhat garbled by a last-minute change in the provision
that included a reference to old § 913.1 as the source of the Board's jurisdiction,
which, in the authors' view, was an improper reference.
152. For a discussion of a court's discretion when deciding whether to accept
additional evidence on appeal, see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
153. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10107(b) (Supp. 1994).
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the municipality lies." 154

"Determinations," which are defined in section 107, are distinguished from "decisions." A "determination" is a "final action by an
officer, body or agency charged with the administration of any land
use ordinance or applications thereunder .. ."155 However, the
definition excepts (as not constituting a "determination") any action by:
(1) the governing body; (2) the zoning hearing board or
(3) the planning agency, only if and to the extent the
planning agency is charged with final decision on preliminary or final plans under the subdivision and land development ordinance or planned residential development
provisions. Determinations shall be appealable only to the
boards designated as having jurisdiction for such
appeal.156
When the planning commission is not given the final decisionmaking function, the action of a governing body denying final subdivision approval appears to be a "decision" that is appealable to a
court. Whether such a denial is a "decision" is debatable, however,
because the action of the governing body on final plan approval
does not fit nicely into the words "final adjudication" used in the
definition of "decision." If a denial of a final plan approval is a
final adjudication, the denial of a preliminary plan approval should
also be a final adjudication, making both appealable to the Court of
Common Pleas.
C.

Provisionsfor ProtestantAppeals

With regard to third parties who are opposed to approval of a
plan ("protestants"), the preliminary approval of a plan should be
treated as a final decision because a developer is entitled to final
approval in accordance with the preliminary approval. Unfortunately, the MPC does not make this point clear. Section 1002-A of
the revised MP C 1 57 requires anyone seeking review of a "decision"
to file an appeal with a court within thirty days after entry of the
decision, as provided in title 42, section 5571 (b) of the Pennsylvania Code. What happens, however, when there is no decision
within ninety days and the application is "deemed approved?" Sec154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 11002-A.
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tion 1002-A refers to section 908(9), which requires that notice of
the deemed approval be published before the thirty-day time for
appeals begins to run, but section 908(9) applies only to Zoning
Hearing Boards.1 5 8 Thus, any decision other than one issued by the
Zoning Hearing Board, which would include "deemed approval"
cases, must be appealed within thirty days from the date when the
decision occurred or was deemed to have occurred, as required by
159
title 42, section 5571 (c) (6) of the Pennsylvania Code.
The problem with section 1002-A, which sends all appeals relating to subdivision approval or disapproval directly to a court, 160 is
16
that a court may, but is not required to, take additional evidence. 1
Because the MPC does not require that a record of the subdivision
and land development proceedings be made below, the fact that
the revised MPC does not allow for a hearing before the Zoning
Hearing Board will make review of such actions very difficult unless
the courts are willing to take additional evidence as a matter of
course.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The major revisions made to the MPC in 1972 were undertaken as a unified whole and were designed to encourage new development, limit local governmental abuses and provide efficient,
practical avenues through which a developer and protestants could
appeal adverse decisions. The changes enacted in 1978 were more
the result of anti-development fervor than of reason. As pointed
out in this Article, such motivating factors do not always produce a
coherent regulatory scheme. In fact, some portions of the revised
MPC now pose unintended traps for developers, protestants and
local governments alike. The more extensive revisions of 1988 carried many of the 1978 changes forward, and, in some instances,
exacerbated the procedural problems created by the earlier
revisions.
Although the litigation procedures applicable to both zoning
challenges and subdivision and land development disputes have
been muddled through the revision process, it is the subdivision
and land development procedures that have prompted the authors
to publish this Article in an attempt to raise awareness of these is158. Id. § 10908(9).
159. For a discussion of "deemed approval" situations, see supra notes 146-47
and accompanying text.
160. PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 53, §

11002-A.

161. Id. § 11005-A.
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sues. If, as is expected, the improving economy encourages new
construction and development projects, the lack of protection for
developers from local arbitrariness as well as the irregularities in
the MPC's litigation procedures will cause unnecessary and intolerable delays for developers along with a new wave of procedural challenges in the courts. Even neighboring landowners, whose interests
were supposedly advanced through the 1978 revisions, will suffer
through an extended period of regulatory instability while the parties attempt to parse and understand the confusing procedures.
To meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, the MPC
should be revised to restore the fundamental concepts of the 1972
MPC:
(1) Local governments should not be permitted to cure a constitutional defect in a zoning ordinance by zoning around a challenger or by prescribing their own diminutive substitute for a
challenger's project. The job of deciding whether a successful challenger should get some or all of what he has asked for should remain with the courts.
(2) The legislature should not tell the courts what criteria to
use when fashioning a constitutionally acceptable remedy. If a
court decides to remand any aspect of a challenger's development
proposal to a local government, the court should retain jurisdiction
so that, upon motion, it may protect the rights of the challenger
during such subsequent local proceedings.
(3) When a miracle occurs and a development proposal is actually approved by a local government, it should not follow that
every neighboring property owner is allowed to drag the approval
through the courts. 162 Legislative changes to the MPC are necessary to curb the practice of "strike suits."
(4) The legislature should also consider abolishing the "curative amendment" challenge route. The precise and limited role
that route was designed to serve has been discussed in this Article;
its purpose, however, has been generally misunderstood. It is senseless to keep a procedure that no one wants or is able to use
properly.
These are some of our suggestions for reform of the zoning
procedures. More important from our point of view, however, is to
convey the message that the new source of arbitrary governmental
decision-making on the local level will arise not out of zoning, but
162. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 131, at 55-63 (refuting common assumption
that standing to challenge proposals extends to any person whose interests are
affected in any way).
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rather out of the current subdivision and land development review
process.
To carry out an overall reform of the MPC, consideration
should be given to the following:
First, because most development involves both zoning and subdivision land development matters, it makes no sense to impose
these regulations through separate local regulatory regimes, each
with its own standards and review procedures. Instead of dividing
the local administrative review of a project between the zoning authorities and the zoning hearing board on the one hand and the
planning commission and governing body on the other, the regulatory system should be unified through one enabling law, one ordinance and one local administrative process.
Second, a conclusion that follows from the first, the subdivision and land development review process should be judicialized"
so that the parties enjoy the same due process safeguards as are
prescribed for zoning matters. There is no justification for requiring local zoning decisions to be made at a formal hearing on the
record and to be supported by findings of fact while allowing land
development and subdivision decisions to be made without a formal hearing, without a record and without findings.' 63 Such reform would go a long way toward limiting the avenues of abuse that
currently exist under the MPC and would encourage local governments to exercise their subdivision and land use powers in a rational manner.
163. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(2) (1972) (requiring rejections be accompanied by written responses and citations to regulations).
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